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Early Parliamentary After the Presidential Election? 
 
The political scene in Serbia will reach its peak at the presidential election that is 
called for September 29, 2002. According to all opinion polls, the key contenders 
will be Vojislav Kostunica and Miroljub Labus, who have ranked as the most 
popular among citizens for a long time. According to the opinion poll carried out 
by Medium Gallup International in June, Kostunica had support of 25% and Labus 
of 18%. At the end of June, Strategic Marketing published that each of these 
candidates had the support of 22%. In another poll, done by the Center for Policy 
Research in July, the order of the two candidates was reversed: Labus enjoyed the 
support of 20% of voters, while Kostunica had 18%. Other candidates for 
presidential elections (Seselj, Zivojinovic, Ilic, Draskovic, Pelevic, etc.) will not 
contend to win at this election, but only to enhance their public presence.  
 
Economic and social issues will prevail in this electoral campaign. According to 
the mentioned poll carried out by the Center for Policy Research, 42% of citizens 
see their life as hardly bearable, while 32% assess their situation as bearable. 
Citizens also assess the socio-economic performance of the Serbian Government 
as poor. Only 11% of them are content with macro-political efficiency of the 
Government, while as much as 64% are not satisfied. Nevertheless, citizens are 
still optimistic: as many as 45% of them believe the next year will be better than 
this year, while 29% expect the year 2003 to be even worse. It could be safely 
assumed that socio-economic problems will be dominant in this campaign, and the 
candidate who is able to convince citizens that they matter and that he has better 
solutions for these problems is more likely to win.  
 
The two main candidates agree that economic issues are the most important in 
Serbia today. Labus puts main emphasis on economic and social issues, and on 
integration with the European Union. He advocates more employment 
opportunities, starting up new businesses, the recovery of construction, 
modernization of infrastructure, improvements in the areas of health care and 
education, and integration of Serbia into the European Union. Kostunica puts main 
emphasis on similar issues, offering similar solutions. He is dissatisfied with the 
privatization process though. Nevertheless, it is hardly possible that either of the 
candidates has something to say essentially different with regard to social and 
economic issues. It is therefore clear that in this area Labus will get the upper hand 
as a person who is an expert on the economy. That is why Kostunica has been 
trying to broaden the campaign agenda by imposing issues such as new 
constitution, parliamentarism, and the rule of law.  
 
Although Labus and Kostunica are the most likely winners at this election, this 
does not mean that the presence of others and the results they are able to score are 
not important. According to the mentioned poll, Pelevic has the support of 5.2% 
voters, Seselj 3.7%, Ilic 4.5%, and the candidate of the Socialist Party 5.2%, while 
according to the July poll, Seselj had 5%, Pelevic 4% and Ilic and Milosevic 3% 
each. To grasp the significance of these digits, it is necessary to remember that 
similar support for Labus and Kostunica suggests that none of them can hope for 
victory in the first round. The decision will consequently be made in the second 
round. Since the candidates who together garnered 15-20% of votes will not take 
part in the run-off, the majority of these votes will have to be distributed between 
Kostunica and Labus. The one who succeeds in attracting this majority will win at 
the presidential election on September 29. 
 
* * * 
 
The September presidential elections will have significant implications on the 
restructuring of the political scene in Serbia. The reason for this is the current 
regrouping of the DAN coalition within the DOS coalition. This coalition, 
composed of the Democratic Alternative, New Democracy and the Democratic 
Center abstained from backing Miroljub Labus on August 17, when DOS 
announced its support for him. This was followed by the announcement of 
possible presidential candidacy of Dragoljub Micunovic in the name of the DAN 
coalition, while in the last week of August this coalition announced its 
disagreement with the content of constitutional charter that was agreed on by the 
governments of Serbia and Montenegro, as well as that, in case that Kostunica and 
Labus enter the second round of the presidential election, this coalition might give 
its support to Vojislav Kostunica.  
 
The departure from the DOS policy implies that the DAN coalition is ready to 
leave DOS and switch to Vojislav Kostunica’s camp if it estimates that he will 
beat Labus in the September elections. This change in course is not transparent at 
this moment, because it is not clear yet if Kostunica is a sure winner. Anyhow, the 
most important implication of the DAN strategy is that if Vojislav Kostunica wins 
in the presidential election, it will seem impossible to prevent the disintegration of 
what remains of the DOS coalition. The breakup of DOS will inevitably result in 
the dissolution of the parliamentary majority that supports the Djindjic 
Government; this will be followed by the fall of the Serbian Government and, 
finally, by an early parliamentary election. 
 
Here two different scenarios with an identical outcome seem to be likely. The first 
is that the Government simply falls. In this case, Djindjic could salvage himself by 
making a coalition with someone from the current opposition. But forming a 
coalition with the Radicals or the Socialists would most likely incite opposition 
within the expert part of the government. This is why the second scenario—by 
which the Prime Minister himself, after realizing that he does not enjoy support in 
the Parliament, calls for the president of the republic to dismiss the National 
Assembly—is more likely. In both cases early parliamentary elections are 
unavoidable and might be called for late 2002 or early 2003. Of course, this 
scenario is less likely if Miroljub Labus wins the elections. In that case, the DAN 
coalition will probably stay in the DOS, thus continuing to ensure the necessary 
majority to the Serbian Government in Parliament. But early elections will still not 
be improbable, although for different reasons, and most probably they will not 
happen in the near future. 
Miroslav Zdravkovic 
 
Fourteen Months After the Donors’ Conference 
 
In May 2001 the impact of the postponement of donors’ conference on economic 
recovery was analyzed. Now, from a distance of almost one and a half year, it is possible 
to discuss real effects of the donors’ conference on economic activities in the country.  
First of all, it was shown that the donors’ conference requires at least six months for its 
effects to come about; no impact should be expected only three months after the 
conference. Namely, it takes at least three months for payments to be made and the 
money used, and additional three months to start the production cycle with the necessary 
purchases of equipment and raw materials from abroad. 
The following chart shows the dynamics of the inflow of donations in the course of year 
2001. 
 
CHART 
Inflow Of Donors’ Assets In US$ Millions 
- pressure for the extradition of Milosevic 
 
Right before the donors’ conference was held, our economy had entered a recession due 
to the lack of assets expected from donors. This period coincided with the beginning of 
fiscal reforms in Serbia. Namely, after having introduced financial discipline, it was 
necessary to introduce fiscal discipline as well, in order to complete the process of 
macroeconomic stabilization. The introduction of fiscal discipline, however, coupled with 
numerous other problems encountered by the Serbian economy at that time, had a 
negative impact on the overall economic activity. In our opinion, this resulted from a long 
lasting practice of “soft budgetary limitations” in the provision of lacking assets for the 
economy, which should have been stopped. The positive impact of fiscal reform referred 
to the increase in public revenues which enabled regular payments of pensions and 
coverage of other public expenditures. More significant downside effects of the fiscal 
reform on economic trends were registered in June 2001, when the reduction of activities 
in particular areas started (Chart 2). 
 
CHART 
De-seasonal Index Of Industrial Production And Effective Hours Of Work In 
Construction (average 2001 = 100) 
- establishment of macroeconomic stability 
- recovery 
- industrial production 
- contraction 
 
The inflow of assets increased again after the donors’ conference, reaching its peak in 
October 2001. This gave strong incentive to the initiation of a positive cycle in the 
economy. The beginning of 2002 marked a significant shift toward more dynamic 
economic activity. In the ensuing months of 2002 the expected recovery was realized. 
However, indicators of economic activity should be taken with reservation since the 
statistics do not cover the major part of the private sector. 
In this article we will analyze only two sectors - industrial production and construction, 
for a very simple reason – these two activities have not sustained any changes in 
statistical coverage, because the private sector is not yet monitored on a monthly basis, 
whereas there are strong indications that the volume of activities in that sector is 
constantly increasing. This is indirectly implied by the real growth of the money supply 
and real public revenues. At the same time, this indicates an increased level of “legal” 
activity within overall economic activity. 
In the de-seasonal series of industrial production, recovery after the October changes 
reached its peak in June 2001, when the index amounted to 103.7 (average 2001 = 100). 
The seven-month recession ended, as we mentioned earlier, in January 2002, when the 
de-seasonal index (with the same basis) amounted to 95.2. The average monthly rate of 
de-seasonal decrease of industrial production in the period June 2001 – January 2002 
averaged 1.21%. 
The “bottom” in January was followed by fast recovery at a rate of 1.3% per month in de-
seasonal series, and thus the index of 103.8 was reached in June (average 2001 – 100). 
After six months of negative year-to-year growth rates, the period January – July 2002 
recorded an increase in industrial production by 0.2% compared to the same period 
during the previous year. Production in July increased by 6.2% compared to the same 
months the previous year, whereas manufacturing, excluding production of electricity, 
registered considerable growth of 10%. The average monthly growth rate of 1.3% in de-
seasonal series leads to the annual growth of 15.6%. With regard to such recovery trends, 
industrial production in Serbia seems more likely to reach the projected level of 3% 
compared to 2001, while the projection of a 2% growth rate in industrial production in 
Serbia released by the G 17 Institute Economic Review from June 2002 seems quite 
certain.  
It is important that these positive trends can be disrupted by negative political shocks. If 
the established trends were not disrupted, in 2003 Serbia would reach a two-figure 
growth rate in industrial production, which would be much higher in the private sector.  
 
CHART  
Export in US$ millions 
 
A direct effect of industrial production recovery, coupled with the successful agricultural 
year of 2001, resulted in a very fast recovery of exports. Exports have been showing a 
notable recovery trend since September 2001, when exports of food industry products 
started to increase considerably. Since January 2001, almost all industries have registered 
high export growth. 
 
CHART 
Indices Of Export Value (the same month of the previous year = 100)  
 
Exports in the Republic of Serbia have very high growth rates; in July 2002 they 
increased by as much as 36.6% (before usual subsequent corrections that will increase 
this rate to almost 50%) compared to July 2001. Fictitious exports (overhauls of airplanes 
in foreign countries entered as exports) resulted in a very high value in March 2001, 
which is confusing for clear identification of positive trends. More intensive criticism of 
the exchange rate policy two times resulted from this unreal high value: (1) in April and 
May 2001, when high negative rates were registered relative to March; (2) in Mach this 
year, when a year-to-year decrease was recorded despite absolutely high value of realized 
export.  
Another economic activity which followed the trends in industrial production was 
construction. Construction activity in the socially-owned sector recorded a considerable 
drop last year. Fast recovery in de-seasonal series, however, does not indicate that a 
positive growth rate will be achieved this year. But it is important to stress that 
construction is a specific activity due to a very large share of the private sector, which is 
not covered statistically.  
Consequently, the dynamics of construction works is underestimated in terms of 
statistics. It serves here as confirmation of the positive effects of the donors’ conference 
and fast recovery of construction activity. Namely, every citizen of the Republic of 
Serbia (except those who live in remote rural areas and who have no access to TV and 
hence are not familiar with the situation in other fields) can see that public construction is 
increasingly intensive: the reconstruction of Belgrade – Nis motorway and other roads, 
revitalization of infrastructure in towns, etc. These are direct consequences of the inflow 
of assets from the donors’ conference which was held in June 2001 and of the loans from 
international financial institutions (World Bank, EBRD, EIB, etc.) under very favorable 
terms. 
The initiated and accelerated public construction works have complex effects: (1) 
thousands of construction workers are engaged which, due to low wages, is directly 
spilling over into spending and affects growth in the production of consumer goods; (2) 
domestic production of raw materials and equipment is engaged in order to meet the 
needs of construction activities and the infrastructure of municipalities.  
The main objective of this article is to establish the displayed positive trends of economic 
activity, which have been clearly inspired by the considerable influx of donors’ assets. 
Presented trends are not fully correct (they are assumed to be much more favorable) due 
to relatively small statistical coverage of economic activity. The private sector has a 
permanent upward trend in its share in our economy, while statistical processing largely 
refers to the socially-owned enterprises, using methodology from twelve years ago. In 
order to adjust our statistics to world standards, it is necessary to support its infrastructure 
in a material sense – to stimulate statistics experts (because most quality experts have 
been leaving statistics bureaus) and to acquire modern equipment. This, among other 
things, requires donors’ assets and foreign expertise. 
The second objective of this article is to express a fear that, if the political situation in the 
country sharpens, it could result in the postponement of the announced new donors’ 
conference, as well as interruption of funding of projects in Serbia by international 
financial organizations., which would affect a turnaround in the expressed trends. In that 
case, the historical opportunity for economic recovery would be missed, with the 
economic harm being immeasurable. 
Macroeconomic theme 
 
Privatization in Serbia: The Second Run 
 
Dusan Pavlovic 
 
 
1. Legal Framework for the Privatization Policy 
 
Privatization in Serbia got its second chance. This time, the Government made it clear 
that it means it. It set up a ministry for privatization; invited world experts to assist in 
drafting the law on privatization; opted for the case-by-case approach and direct sale 
model; started restructuring big enterprises before selling them off; and engaged in a 
serious advertisement campaign to make privatization acceptable to the Serbian 
public. 
 
In the new Privatization Law, the Government dropped the management-employee 
buyout (MEBO) model, which was introduced under the 1997 Ownership 
Transformation law (Sluzbeni glasnik Republike Srbije, no. 32/97). The solutions 
postulated under the 1997 Law have been justly abandoned for two reasons. Firstly, 
barring Slovenia, no country that has deployed MEBO was successful in 
implementing privatization. Countries such as Russia, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, 
Uzbekistan, Armenia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Albania, and finally Yugoslavia until 
2001, faced insurmountable obstacles in the implementation of this model. These 
countries were ranked very low on the list of successfully implemented privatization 
programs published by the European Bank for Reconstruction in 1999. This fact 
indicates that MEBO is inherently flawed. Secondly, applying the MEBO model in 
Serbia was actually an attempt to stall privatization in Serbia and allow the political 
elite, previously filtered by the Socialist party and JUL, to assume ownership without 
putting it in the right use.  
 
The new Privatization Law, enacted on June 29, 2001 makes privatization obligatory. 
The state was given a greater role in ensuring the certainty of the process. The Serbian 
parliament adopted a set of laws and measures that regulate the privatization process. 
 
o The privatization law (June 29, 2001; Sluzbeni glasnik Republike Srbije  no. 
38/01); 
o The privatization agency law (June 29, 2001; SG RS, no. 38/01); 
o The share fund law (June 29, 2001; SG RS, no. 38/01); 
o The ordinance concerning tender sale of capital and assets (July 17, 2001; SG 
RS, no. 45/01); 
o The ordinance concerning auction sale of capital and assets (July 17, 2001; SG 
RS, no. 45/01) (amended on August 2, 2002; SG RS, no. 45/02); 
o The ordinance concerning the methodology for assessment of value of capital 
and assets (July 17, 2001; SG RS, no. 45/01) (amended on August 2, 2002; SG 
RS, no. 45/02); 
o The rulebook concerning the content and methods for running the privatization 
register (August 29, 2001; SG RS no. 52/01); 
o The rulebook concerning the content and methods for running the temporary 
register (August 29, 2001; SG RS no. 52/01); 
 2
o The rulebook concerning the level of the cost of privatization before the 
Agency for privatization incurred by enterprises and other legal persons 
(September 28, 2001; SG RS no. 57/01); 
o The rulebook concerning the prospectus form (July 19, 2001; SG RS no. 
44/01). 
 
The new Law on Privatization tries from the very beginning to avoid the trap of the 
past. Articles 1 and 3 set forth that both collective and state-owned property must be 
transformed. Article 2 lays out four basic principles of privatization:  
a) creating conditions for development of the economy and social stability;  
b) transparency of the process;  
c) flexibility;  
d) letting the market form the prices of firms.  
 
It can be seen that privatization is not a goal in itself, but that the goal is to create 
basic institutions of market economy. The Law is supposed to make the privatization 
process transparent, meaning that the public has the right to be informed in a timely 
fashion what firms are up for privatization, who buys them, and if the procedures for 
privatization are being carried out according to the law. Finally, point d) insists that 
firms be sold at prices formed by the markets, and not determined by the 
administration.  
 
These are the major institutions for implementing the privatization policy: the 
ministry for privatization, the privatization agency, the share fund, and the 
contemporary register (which in time is supposed to turn into a regular privatization 
register). The agency forms commissions that run tenders and auction sales. 
 
Article 9 postulates two models of privatization: sale of capital and transfer of capital 
with no compensation (Table 1). Sale can be divided into public tender and public 
auction, whereas assets can be transferred to workers and citizens. 
 
1. Sale of capital 2. Transfer of capital with no 
compensation 
Methods of sale Methods of transfer 
1) Public tender 1) Transfer of shares to employees 
2) Public auction 2) Transfer of shares to citizens 
Table 1: Models of privatization according to the June 29 Law. 
 
The new privatization law, which adopts sale models, gives priority to outsiders to 
buy firms. The goal is not just to sell domestic firms, but to sell them to so-called 
strategic partners who will continue to produce, not shut the firm down as soon as 
they move in. Strategic partners are expected to use resources more rationally, insist 
on and establish profit-based orientation of the firm, thereby creating an environment 
for a market economy to thrive, which leads to opening of new working places. There 
are three key conditions for tender sales: 
a) offered price;  
b) social program;  
c) the level of new investments in the firm. 
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Auction sales are carried out in designated places where firms are sold by public 
bidding. Whereas in tender sales there are several conditions that determine who is the 
buyer, the sole condition that determines the outcome of the bid being the price—
whoever bids the highest price takes away what is up for sale. As opposed to a tender 
where the Agency organizes and carries out the whole process, an auction is only 
organized by the Agency, whereas the carrying out is done by a commission set up by 
the Agency. 
 
Although article 12 postulates that buyers can be subjects from the inside but also 
from the outside of the company, the very same article makes it clear that Yugoslav 
citizens can buy capital or assets only after submitting proofs on not having 
obligations that stem from the Law on one-off extra profit and extra assets of June 22, 
2001 (Sluzbeni Glasnik RS, no. 36/01). The key motivation for this proviso is 
political: it was supposed to block the people who benefited from close ties with 
Milosevic from turning their wealth into private property by laundering their assets.  
 
Articles 42-45 postulate that up to 30% of the assets of each firm may be transferred 
to workers, ex-workers (pensioners), and citizens. The worker obtains up to € 200 of 
shares for each working year. The total of the year is 35, which makes all in all € 
7,000 of shares free of charge.  
 
The two models of privatization proscribed by the June 29 law are by no means equal 
in weight. The sale model dominates the transfer model. Sale is the model the 
government prefers, meaning that enterprises simply must be sold. It is postulated that 
up to 70% of the capital must be sold either by tender or at auction, whereas the 
remaining 30% will be transferred to employees or citizens, but only after the selling 
of the 70% (articles 42-54). More importantly, although the Law is not explicit on 
this, the Government made it clear that tenders will be deployed for big and strategic 
firms, whose number most likely does not exceed 200. All smaller and medium-size 
enterprises, whose number is estimated at about 7,000, are planned to be sold at public 
auction.  
 
Tenders are of crucial importance for the privatization process, for the biggest firms, 
which employ the majority of the population, and will be sold on tenders. They are 
organized and carried out by the Agency for privatization. The procedure covers: 
preparation for sale, public advertising, accepting the bids, assessment of the bids, 
closing contracts, and other things (Art. 27). The Agency is in charge of tender and 
auction procedures, but article 29 says that the minister for privatization forms a 
commission in charge of overseeing the tender procedure. The commission has a 
president and four  members who approve the result of the public tender. The bidder 
must pay a deposit in order to be eligible to bid (art 30). The Minister for Privatization 
sets the sum of the deposit.  
 
 
2. The Reality of Privatization in Serbia After June 29, 2001 
 
The first step in making fertile ground for privatization is to impose financial 
discipline and ensure competition. This practically means that all enterprises are 
denied bank credits on easy terms and arrears on payments, custom duties and social 
security. Serbian firms were accustomed to using so-called soft credits, usually doled 
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out by the Development fund set up by the Serbian government. Soft credits were 
easy to get, but it was almost easier not to return them on time, or to return them 
under silly conditions. This practically helped many socialist enterprises survive 
throughout the 90s, but this is also what did not push them into restructuring and 
privatization under the 1997 privatization law. In 2001, the Serbian Government 
abolished the institution of soft credit, which made some firms go out of business. But 
it retained the policy of covering the losses of large infrastructure and energy 
enterprises (such as electricity or railway systems). These companies still gobble up 
huge amounts of the Serbian budget. So far, the government did not do much to 
restructure big infrastructure enterprises. The Serbian electric company is, for 
example, overstaffed with about 67,000 people employed, which is approximately 
twice the number of the employed it should have. It is especially worrisome that along 
with the increase in the price of electricity, business losses of this company are also 
increasing. For instance, in 2000, the KwH of the electric energy cost $0.85 cents, and 
the total loss for 2000 was $121 million. In 2001, the price rose to $1.41 c, whereas 
the loss was $202 million. In July 2002, the price went to $3 c per KwH, but the 
projected loss is $377 million. This clearly shows that government still has no general 
plan as to what to do with the biggest public enterprises. 
 
Since the major problem that any reform government faces are so-called socialist 
giants—which do business with losses, are incapable of paying debts, and specifically 
have flawed organizational structure—the government had to engage in targeted top-
down programs to restructure enterprises. These big industrial enterprises with 
thousands of employed were in such a poor condition which called for restructuring 
before being put on sale. Since it is to be expected that no investor will buy a firm that 
calls for immediate lay offs, the government took up to do this dirty job. The 
privatization agency makes a decision as to whether the firm has to restructure or goes 
directly on tender or auction. If restructuring is necessary, the government comes up 
with a special program for each firm. The Agency’s decision is conclusive. This is 
why for many firms a special preparation for selling is called for. In August 2002, 26 
big enterprises was in the process of restructuring, and by the end of the year, the total 
of 44 are expected to be in the process. 
 
It must be stressed that restructuring of firms has to be done sooner or later. Most of 
the firms have already been downsized but still look rather unattractive for the 
potential investors. In spring 2002, after the first round of restructuring of the Zastava 
factory has been done, the government could not sell Zastava even for one dollar. This 
means that the very same firms will need another round of restructuring, which will 
additionally burden the government that hardly survived the restructulization of the 
first round.  
 
The Serbian government, especially the ministry for privatization, was rather sanguine 
about the start of privatization process. It set off into advertising privatization to 
foreign donors, and restructuring enterprises for sale. However, the result of the first 
year of privatization was far from cheerful. The government seems to have spent more 
energy on arranging the documentation and procedures for privatization but it did not 
really privatize much. The number of firms awaiting privatization (Table 2) vastly 
exceeded the number of firms that were privatized. 
 
 Firms ready for Number of Book value on Dec. 
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privatization employees 31, 2000 in € 000 
Total 285 96,522 603,787 
Tenders 63 53,492 343,301 
Auctions 222 43,030 260,485 
Table 2: Enterprises ready to be privatized in May 2002. (Source: Privatization in Serbia, no. 4, May 
2002, p. 5.) 
 
The reality looks somewhat different. So far, five firms were privatized on tender, and 
22 on auction sales. Table 3 shows  the total of the privatized firms, whereas Tables 4  
and 5 show the details on each tender and auction sale. 
 
 Number of 
enterprises 
Number of 
employees 
Revenues from 
sales in 000 € 
Required 
investments in 
000 € 
Total 27 9,589 182,410 261,807 
Tender 5 7,392 170,890 260,340 
Auctions 22 2,197 11,520 1,467 
Table 3: Tender and auction sales: The results so far. 
 
Name of 
factory 
Line of 
business 
Name of 
strategic 
partner 
Final 
price in 
mil. $ 
Percent of 
capital 
privatized 
Obliged 
to invest 
in mil. $ 
Sale 
closed on 
Beocin Cement 
production 
Lafarge, 
France 
50.9 70% 32.3 1/29/02 
Kosijeric Cement 
production 
Titan, 
Greece 
35.5  70% 29.6 1/30/02 
Novi 
Popovac 
Cement 
production 
Holcim, 
Switzerland 
52.5 70% 83.9 1/30/02 
Seval, 
Sevojno 
Aluminium 
processing 
Impol, 
Slovenia 
7.5 70% 14.5 8/27/02 
Merima, 
Krusevac 
Household 
consumables 
Henkel, 
Germany 
14.4 70% 43.1 8/28/02 
TOTAL   160  203  
Table 4: The result of tender sales. 
 
Name and site of firm Number of  
employeed 
Line of bussines Price (in 000 YuD) 
Autoservis, Priboj 43 Maintenance and 
repairment of cars 
2,352 
Elgrakop Plc, Ljig 63 Colours production 14,625 
Ornament, Subotica 47 Façade making 5,796 
Diork, Kragujevac 363 Clothes making 13,610 
Golubac, Arilje 76 Hotel management 29,019 
Loznica, Loznica 9 Fruits and vegetables 190 
Montaža, Beograd 521 Construction 34,864 
Zlatibor, Čajetina 132 Production of milk, meat, 
and eggs 
66,640 
Neimar, Valjevo 22 Construction materials 316 
Zorka-boje, Šabac 177 Chemical industry 232,530 
Hladnjača, Ljubovija 51 Fruits and vegetables deep 
freezing 
18,048 
Palisad, Čajetina 164 Retail and wholesale 47,769 
Kijevo, Beograd 78 Stone exploitation 55,048 
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Građa, Beograd 16 Trade 11,562 
Metalservis, Smederevo 31 Trade 2,952 
Remont, Bečej 80 Maintenance of motor 
vehicles 
7,636 
Standard, Novi Sad 92 Bags 29,024 
Granit, Ljubovija 65 Stonebreaking 50,336 
Milivoj Lazin, B. 
Aranđelovo 
65 Agriculture products 41,373 
Metalac, Kladovo 11 Making of metal 
construction 
6,322 
Riboteks, Ljubovija 16 Fishpooling 18,681 
Iverak, Valjevo 56 Metal hardware 10,368 
TOTAL   691,204 
Table 5: Auction sales so far 
 
Discouraged by the slowness of the auction sales, the Serbian government on July 3, 
2002 announced it would slacken off the conditions for auction sale. The changes 
took place in the form of two ordinances of August 1, 2002. (Ordinance concerning 
amendments of Ordinance concerning the sale of capital on public auction, SG RS, no. 
45/02; Ordinance concerning amendments of the Ordinance concerning the 
methodology for assessment of value of capital and assets, SG RS no. 45/02). The 
major change regarded the method for assessing the value of the firm. The ordinance 
concerning the methodology introduces the corrected book value for assessing the 
value of the firm. The reason for this was that the initial prices on auction sales turned 
out to be too high. Take for example “Ribotex.” First time it was tried to be sold, the 
initial value was ½ million euros. The auction failed. When corrected book value was 
applied, the initial price was 200,000 €, and at the end of auction, it was sold for 
491,000 €. 
 
There were some changes regarding bidding and price. The so-called English methods 
of bidding is abandoned, and only the Dutch bidding remained. The bidding now 
starts always from 80% of the estimated price, and goes only higher. The government 
also announced it would form a special fund with 100-150 million € from which 
potential buyers can borrow the money to bid on auction. All this, the government 
expected, would speed up the process of auction sales, that from July 21 was 
supposed to be taking place on a weekly basis. 
 
 
3. Some Recommendations for A More Successful Privatization Policy 
 
A) One can identify several problems with the privatization policy. The first one is 
related to relatively high risks encountered by foreign investors and the lack of capital 
in the country. Foreign investors still hesitate to make more energetic entry into the 
Serbian market. Financial risks are considerably reduced due to established 
macroeconomic stability with low inflation and clear credit and monetary policy. 
Certain risks refer to the lack of necessary financial institutions. The Federal 
Government has not done much with regard to the adoption of legislation on 
securities, investment funds, and accounting. Finally, political risks in terms of 
undefined federal state and unstable political situation in Serbia discourage foreign 
investors, too. 
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On the other hand, it is well known that sale model works best in market conditions. 
One reason why the Serbian government opted for sale model derives from the nature 
of obstacles that existed in the 90s. It is said that the 1997 law could not work because 
the political obstacles for privatization were in place. Now that the political obstacles 
are removed, privatization can get off the ground. This sounds reasonable, but the 
problem is that the removal of political obstacles were not enough in circumstances 
where there are economic obstacles. Tender and auction sale works properly only in a 
market economy, which implies the absence of economic obstacles. In the Serbian 
case, this condition does not obtain. The difficulty indeed consists in the scarcity of 
money that is supposed to be after the capital. Since tender and auction sales are the 
two dominant methods, the natural expectation would be that demand tallies with 
supply. Unfortunately, this is not the case.  
 
B) A problem not yet visible in the privatization process, but very likely to emerge, is 
the relation between the government and the opposition, i.e. the government and trade 
unions. Successful privatization requires the Government to build up a kind of 
coalition among main social, political, financial, and international actors that have any 
interest in privatization. In terms of politics, a consensus on privatization concept 
broke up because Democratic part of Serbia started advocating the partial return to 
MEBO model, i.e. the solution from the 1997 privatization law. On the other hand, the 
relation between the Government and trade unions is also not cooperative. It is 
necessary to bear in mind that real effects, such as massive layoffs of workers, have 
not taken place yet. Consequently, the Government should try hard to reestablish 
political consensus among political parties, and to strengthen social consensus with 
trade unions if privatization speeds up in the course of 2003. 
 
C) Privatization process seems to be overadministered by the Serbian Government, 
and the Privatization Agency. Article 16 of the Privatization Law says that 
privatization procedure can be initiated by the Agency, by the enterprise in question 
or by the interested investor. But the initiation is only an expression of intent, while 
the Agency is in charge of issuing a permit. To quicken the privatization, local 
governments should be allowed not only to initiate privatization, but also to kick off 
the process and carry it out. As an incentive for this, the Law can arrange that for each 
initiated privatization the portion of assets obtained by local community is increased 
from the present 5% to 8 or 10%. 
 
D) Privatization needs not to be accepted by big investors only, but by small 
shareholders, too. This requires institutions, such as investment funds, which protect 
the interests of small shareholders. Small shareholders are also protected by the stock 
exchange market that works without manipulation. Malverzation with shares of the 
Apatin Brewery that took place in April 2002 does not suggest to citizens that 
shareholding is a profitable activity. In that sense, it is necessary to pay special 
attention on the functioning of existing institutions besides the establishment of the 
new ones. 
 
E) Privatization is not an objective in itself. Privatization makes sense only if it 
increases efficiency and productivity of enterprises. The final objective of 
privatization is higher economic growth. According to the experience of Central and 
Eastern European countries which launched their privatization programs in 1990, 
economic growth is enhanced best through greenfield investments. Foreign investors, 
 8
however, face many problems in this field, too, due to the unnecessary convoluted 
administrative system that makes doing business in Serbia too costly and too 
irrational. Only when these obstacles are removed, privatization will not be seen as 
panacea for the Serbian economy, but as only one segment that contributes to its 
recovery. 
Institutional Topic 
 
Ana Djoric, M.A. 
 
CONSUMER PROTECTION POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
Short Overview  
 
 
The Roma Treaties (1957) set out the establishment of a single market with free 
movement of people, goods, services and capital as one of the main objectives. In that 
respect, these treaties provided for appropriate instruments aimed at the realization of this 
objective, coupled with several joint policies (agricultural, trade and traffic policies). The 
consumer protection policy was not an integral part of the Treaty. At that time, the 
awareness of the significance of this issue was not present yet. 
The first initiatives and first regulations in the area of consumer protection appeared in 
the Western world in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Consumer protection rights 
sustained considerable development as late as in the early 1970s, when Member States 
started adopting first regulations. Although having belonged to the joint European 
heritage, those countries had a diverse social and cultural tradition and different 
institutions, legal systems and policies. Legal regulations in the area of consumer 
protection were developing under the influence of these numerous diversities. Two trends 
were notable. One group of countries considered it necessary to regulate this area with 
laws and to develop appropriate administrative organizations that will be in charge of 
their enforcement, taking care of forthcoming changes, getting feedback and being ready 
to react to them appropriately, with the main objective being to provide better protection 
of their clients. Another group of states, however, advocated a less formal and a more 
pragmatic approach, giving absolute preference to the principle of self-regulation, 
adopting regulations on only several issues which were considered most important. 
Almost all of them shared the opinion that the area of food products is a very delicate 
issue and hence requires special care. As Member States were pursuing different policies 
with different priorities, but without coordinated work, consumer protraction was not 
regulated in a uniform way at the community level. 
Over the course of time, the Community’s attitude changed. The first initiatives 
appeared at the beginning of the 1970s. At the Paris Meeting in 1972, a will for 
undertaking some concrete measures in this field was publicly expressed for the first 
time. Several years later, in 1975, the Commission adopted its first program in the form 
of consumer protection action plan (OG EC, no. C 92, April 25, 1975).  This text 
contained five basic rights that will be under special attention due to their significance. It 
was considered that consumers must be protected in legal terms in the area of health and 
safety, their economic interests, the compensation of damages, that they must be provided 
with information and adequate education, as well as with rights to representation. 
Consumers were thus given a possibility to self-organize and establish associations 
for protecting and advocating their interests. In that way consumers got rights to be 
represented and to institutionalize their existence in a certain way, and thus to increase 
possibilities for their influence on the market. The availability of information to a certain 
extent increased too, and the education of consumers began. Simultaneously, the 
possibilities of greater guarantees of protection in the purchase of goods and services 
were growing,  
The Commission continued to make plans and working programs. Consumers were 
increasingly called to speak out. Special emphasis was put on their right to information. 
Thus, one of the first measures that were implemented referred to the regulations on the 
labeling of food products and on false advertising. It was considered that a consumer had 
the right to know the ingredients of a product they intended to buy and to use for 
nutrition. Also, commercials could not be allowed to mislead consumers or to offer them 
false values (a slogan for the Nestle powder milk “Better than mother’s milk”). 
Especially sensitive to the rights of the child and to the necessity of special protection, 
standards were adopted to regulate the conditions that children’s toys must meet in order 
to appear on sale. Later rules referred to the regulations on over-board payments, on 
certain clauses in contracts, on time-sharing, etc. The efforts made in that time gradually 
created a new kind of law, today known as a community law on consumer protection. 
A turning point in the change of the official EU position with regard to consumer 
protection was the adoption of the Single Act in 1987. This was the first contract that 
mentioned the word Consumer (article 100A). This was the period of intensive work on 
the establishment of a single market, when it was realized that consumers are very 
important for the market, its establishment and operation.  Fragmented actions, as 
undertaken at the level of member states, could not lead to joint objectives, and actions 
had to be taken at higher levels. The Community is a subject that should take care of the 
internal market and play a central role on it, removing all obstacles for its work. At the 
same time,. it must supervise the application of adopted rules in practice. The 
Commission was officially authorized to take care of consumer protection. Decisions in 
this area were predicted to be made unanimously. This was not a complete exclusion of 
the authority of member states. Community regulations should have been treated as 
additional and supplemental to national regulations to the extent necessary for the 
realization of the Community’s objectives.  
Considering the number of consumers (about 240 million at that time) and their daily 
presence on the market, it was correctly estimated that they knew best what was 
happening on that market. They should have advised competent authorities on the 
problems they were facing; their objections and remarks should be taken into 
consideration for creating best solutions. Consumers’ participation in the creation of 
internal markets should have been increased.  
The 1992 Mastricht Treaty established a common policy in this area, while article 
129A set out a legal framework for its further development. It was confirmed that the 
Union should “give its contribution to the strengthening of consumer protection”. This 
opened new prospects and was followed by the adoption of several Green papers. Green 
Papers are intended to inspire debates and conferences on particular issues at the level of 
the Union as a whole. These works should show whether these topics deserve to be given 
more attention and whether they require particular measures to be undertaken. The 
Commission adopted several documents of this type (e.g. on financial services, on food 
products, on guarantees, on consumer protection rights before competent authorities, 
etc.). 
The consumer protection policy, which has existed since 1992, entails that the Union 
establishes the main requirements in the area of health and safety, i.e. economic interests 
of consumers that must be protected to a very high extent and for which the Union is 
accountable before consumers. All products and services present on the market must be 
safe; consumers must be informed on these products so as to be able to choose those 
which respond best to their needs. In theory, the Union takes great care of its consumers, 
by pursuing control over products and goods present on its market. All products must 
pass through two kinds of very strict controls before appearing on internal markets 
– internal and community control. The difference between them is almost wiped out 
today since all products must pass both controls. An exception to this rule refers to 
smaller-scale production, when the amount of final products is small and therefore such 
products can be traded only on the local level. Owing to the requirements that must be 
fulfilled – requirements related to packaging, labeling, and safety of products in general – 
consumers today have no reason to worry. Once the product appears on the market with 
the label “Conformed to EU standards”, it is undoubtedly safe to use. We can see 
different examples in practice, though. In that sense, a big scandal has shaken Italy 
recently, when it was necessary to check whether the labels on food products contain 
necessary information and whether consumers were provided with information on 
genetically modified organisms in them, which must be done according to EU 
regulations. The results of the research were discouraging, as it turned out that only 10% 
of products contain true data on contents on their labels. It is therefore understandable 
why the Member States’ governments are still authorized to prohibit trade in any 
products they estimate as dangerous, despite all labels on it. In that case, the 
Commission must be advised of the undertaken measure. If they turn out to be justified, 
the Commission will inform all other member states, which will possibly entail the 
handing over of the violator to the EU Court of Justice.  
Over the period 1996 – 1998, the Commission gave priority to the regulation of financial 
services due to the great importance of this area, while food products, as another very 
important area, is still in focus. This was especially the case when internal markets 
were disrupted due to the mad cow disease. The crisis shook the whole of European 
society. The issue was largely discussed under health protection and under what measures 
should be undertaken so as to assure the final consumer of a product in its safety and 
quality. It was necessary to regain and then to strengthen the confidence of consumers, as 
confidence is a necessary element in a successful market. There was even a suggestion to 
change the composition of the Commission and the way it operates, and to offer better 
guarantees for safety in the area of nutrition. Several plans and analyses were made, and 
on that basis the Commission reorganized its departments (General Directive no. 24 
which deals with consumer protection was reorganized). Necessary attention was paid to 
the education of consumers in order to increase their participation and clearer initiative. 
Simultaneously, special actions were taken to assist Eastern European countries and 
developing countries which have just started working on the adoption of their own 
regulations in this area. 
The Amsterdam Treaty (1997) gave new impetus to consumer protection. It was 
clearly stressed that health protection, safety and the economic interests of consumers, 
their right to information, education and organization in order to protect their interests are 
the main objectives which the Union must take care (art.153 according to new 
numeration). Furthermore, it is asserted that consumer interests should be taken into 
account with regard to other areas, as well, since today more than ever all areas of 
societal life are mutually connected and intertwined. Consumer protection cannot be 
analyzed without regard for environmental protection, development, transport services, 
financial services, competition, agriculture, foreign trade, etc. because this would give an 
incomplete picture, which does not correspond to reality and actual needs. External 
factors also have significant impact on consumer behavior. Systematic inclusion of the 
interests of consumers in all other areas of the Union’s activities is essential. 
The changes which occurred in recent few years affected the area of consumers 
protection. The beginning of monetary union and the introduction of the Euro as a single 
currency introduced a new dimension on the single market. A significant psychological 
barrier, which used to prevent large purchases in other member states, disappeared, while 
the comparison of prices became considerably easier. Social, economic and technological 
changes came about in various sectors. A key factor in these changes is also the 
increasing usage of the Internet, i.e. services offered through this medium. Consumers’ 
habits are changing, while the sector of services is experiencing new expansion. 
Consumers expect a lot form the Union, but at the same time, feel increasingly drafted 
apart from it. It is necessary to undertake new measures in order to continue ensuring 
high level of protection.  
A new document adopted by the EU Commission in the course of last year and this 
year deals with the analysis of these problems and offers possible solutions. 
The Green Paper on Consumer Protection in the EU (October 2, 2001) aims at 
analyzing possible orientations of consumer protection according to the results and 
conclusions that come out of debates of interested parties. In this way, obstacles for 
further development will be considered from all aspects and by all participants. Possible 
solutions will be offered, too, which should be adopted so as to harmonize regulations in 
this area; this is necessary for proper functioning of the market. In order to attain desired 
results, both member states and the Commission must invest considerable effort on behalf 
of the Union. The Green Paper proposes improvement in cooperation of public services 
in charge of the implementation of regulations on consumer protection. 
The main problem that must be resolved in order to ensure consumer protection on the 
internal market refers to overcoming differences that exist in national legislations of 
member states, which concern trade practices of enterprises toward consumers. 
According to the current state of affairs, none of them at present can benefit from 
potential possibilities offered by internal markets, not to mention new possibilities that 
are opened by the introduction of the Euro on January 1, 2002 or from e-business.  
The Green Paper fulfilled its role as a document aimed at providing food for thought and 
at initiating consultations at the Union level on particular issues. On May 7, 2002 (COM 
(2002) 208 final) the Commission submitted its proposal to the Parliament, the 
Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Region on the 
strategy of consumer protection for the period 2002 – 2006.  
The definition of “consumer protection policy” is somewhat changed and includes the 
safety of consumers, as well as economic and legal aspects related to markets, 
information and education of consumers, the promotion of organizations that deal with 
consumer protection and their contributions, together with other participants in the 
creation of consumer protection policy. The issue of food products safety is not an 
integral part of this strategy. Considering its significance, this issue will be subject to 
special regulations (more information on safety of food products – the White Paper of 
January 12, 2000, which also contains the program for legal reforms in this area, 
document no. COM (19999) 719 final). 
The consumer protection policy in the EU is at critical point today. In the coming years 
consumers will have to feel benefits from internal markets and from the implementation 
of a single currency. They will have to see concrete results from the inclusion of their 
interests in all other community policies. New consumers as well, those that will appear 
on a single market after the enlargement of the Union, projected for 2004, should be able 
to make use of these privileges. Consumers expect from the Union that it takes care of 
them. The Commission adopted a strategy for the period of the next five years.  The 
answer of other competent institutions is now being awaited. 
 
In Lieu of a Conclusion 
 
Although the area of consumer protection is very important, in our country little has been 
done in that respect. The isolation of the country and the events that happened on this 
territory can not be used as excuses for such a situation any more, even more so because 
of the trend of the opening of the market, whereby one of the major objectives of the 
country is accession to the EU. It is true that our market does not have strong enough 
competition, while the quality of goods and services is disputable. In what way they are 
going to respond to the challenge of the entry of foreign goods that have already 
appeared, and are yet to appear, is a big question. A special topic for consideration is how 
to sell our goods to foreign markets. 
At the same time, the state should strengthen control of products in order to protect final 
consumers and in order to avoid becoming a place for trading products that cannot be 
sold on the EU market. 
It is certain that a well-organized institution of consumers would be very beneficial. 
Serbia does not have an organization for consumer protection. 
Federal Parliament adopted the Law on Consumer Protection  (FRY Official Gazette, no. 
37, July 3, 2002). 
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Macroeconomic Review 
 
INCREASE IN PRODUCTION AND EXPORTS UNDER CONDITIONS OF 
MACROECONOMIC STABILITY 
 
The inflation rate in August was up by 0.4% month-on-month. The achieved 
consumer price indices by consumption groups show that the increase in the 
price of electricity in July had a mild short-term impact on trends in other prices. 
This confirms that the Serbian economy became market oriented in practical 
terms and largely accepted the rules of market behavior. Production and exports 
recorded growth in July. The purchasing power of employees and pensioners in 
Serbia is permanently increasing, being considerably higher in 2002 compared to 
the previous year. The characteristics of the formal labor market in Serbia are the 
following: (1) the total number of employees is steady; (2) considerable decrease 
of employment in the socially-owned sector; (3) a significant increase of 
employment in the private sector; (4) the unemployment rate is kept at the last 
month’s level, with a mild year-to-year increase. Relatively favorable structural 
trends on the labor market and funds provided for social programs largely 
neutralize the downside effects of restructuring in the real sector. As far as the 
monetary area is concerned, foreign currency reserves continue to grow, while 
the fiscal area is characterized by stable inflow of public revenues. 
 
Prices 
 
Retail prices in Serbia in August were up by 0.4% month-on-month. With regard 
to groups of products, industrial products displayed a growth in prices by 0.2% in 
August due to the increase in the prices of beverages and industrial food 
products. The impact of seasonal factors and the ratio of supply to demand for 
agricultural products brought about deflation in the prices of agricultural products 
in August. This group of products registered a drop in prices by 3.6%. The prices 
of goods in August remained unchanged, while the prices of services were up by 
1.6%. 
According to forecasts by the G 17 Institute (Economic Review, issue 30, June 
2002), projected year-end inflation is about 12% (measured by the ratio of index 
of prices in December 2002 to the index registered in the same month of the 
previous year). The projected inflation includes July’s correction in the price of 
electricity. Compared with December 2001, inflation in August was 9%. The ratio 
of the average price rise in August 2002 to the August 2001 is 16.4%. If prices 
sustain the present level of increase up to the end of the year, the previously 
estimated inflation rate is not likely to be exceeded. 
Excluding negative growth rate in consumer prices registered in January, the 
0.1% increase in August is the lowest growth rate in this indicator of standards of 
living measured from the beginning of this year. 
In August, the price of goods comprising the CPI was down by 0.3% on average, 
while prices of services rose by 3%. The prices of nutrition, clothes and footwear 
and hygiene and health care also decreased, which contributed to the low value 
of the consumer price index. More significant increase in prices was registered in 
the group of education, culture and leisure (4.2%) and traffic vehicles and 
services (1.1%). Housing costs in August were up by 0.8% month-on-month. 
 
CHART 
Annual Inflation in Serbia 
 
Wages and Pensions 
 
The average nominal net wage in July 2002 was YuD 9,342, displaying a growth 
of 3.9% compared to the previous month. Since consumer prices in July were up 
by 4.3% month-to-month, the average net wage was down by 0.4% in real terms. 
However, real growth of the average wage registered in July 2002 year-on-year 
was 28.9%, or 2.9% relative to December 2001. 
The value of the statistical consumer basket for a four-member family in July 
2002 dropped by 4.5% relative to June. The ratio of the consumer basket to the 
nominal net wage decreased from 1.3 in the period March - June to 1.2 in July.  
With regard to the same month of the previous year, the ratio of the consumer 
basket to the nominal net wage decreased by 32%, i.e. it took almost two wages 
to cover one consumer basket in July 2001, while in July 2002 this ratio was 
reduced to 1.2, indicating considerable improvement in purchasing power of the 
employed. 
A pension paid out by the Old Age Pension and Disability Insurance Fund of the 
Employed in August averaged YuD 6,390, which is nominally at the level of the 
average pension paid out in the previous month, while in real terms it was down 
by 0.4%, However, the average pension paid out in August 2002 recorded an 
increase by 31.1% year-to-year, or by 3.0% relative to December 2001. 
The ratio of the average pension to the average net wage in June 2002 was 
68.9%, while the proportion of the average pension to the average gross wage 
was 47.8%. It might be safely concluded that, by the application of new 
methodology of adjustment of pension trends and the enforcement of the new 
Law, this ratio was reduced to acceptable measures, taking into account the 
experience of developed European countries. 
Labor Market 
 
According to the available data, the total number of employees remained at 
approximately the same level. Employment in the socially-owned sector 
continued to drop. In July 2002 this sector employed 1,450,228 persons, which is 
down by 6.5% year-to-year, or by 4.9% relative to December 2001. However, 
according to the assessment made by the Republican Bureau for Information and 
Statistics in July 2002, employment in the private sector was up by 11% year-on-
year, while in small-sized enterprises it increased by 5.6% over the same period. 
The unemployment rate in Serbia in July was 27.95%, which is almost 
unchanged compared to the previous month, while it increased by 0.92 
percentage points with regard to July 2001, or by 0.67 percentage points relative 
to December 2001. 
The number of unemployment benefits recipients rose by 26.7% in the period 
January – June 2002 compared to the same period of the previous year. 
According to the latest data from June 2002, the total number of unemployment 
benefits recipients is 69,716 persons, which is up by 23.14% year-on-year. The 
number of unemployment benefits recipients on the basis of lay-offs increased by 
24.55%, reaching 37,331 persons in June 2002, while the number of recipients 
on the basis of bankruptcy was 22,348 persons, displaying a growth of 48.8%. 
The number of unemployment benefits recipients on the basis of lay-offs and 
bankruptcies in June 2002 increased by 3.9% month-to-month. 
 
CHART 
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- private sector 
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Production and Services 
 
Industrial production in Serbia in July was up by 6.2% year-to-year. The highest 
growth was registered in the sector of manufacturing (10%), while the sector of 
mining and quarrying was in stagnation (0.7% growth); the sector of energy, gas 
and water supply dropped by 7.2%. 
Within the manufacturing sector, the highest growth was registered in the 
manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products (it rose more than twice), as 
well as in the manufacture of electrical machines and appliances, the 
manufacture of basic metals, the manufacture of food and beverages, and the 
manufacture of other transportation equipment. The growth in the manufacture of 
coke and petroleum mainly resulted from the increased production in Vojvodina 
(by 150%); as regards Central Serbia, production in this industry fell compared to 
2001. On the other hand, growth in the manufacture of electrical machinery and 
appliances and the manufacture of basic metals resulted from the increased 
production in Central Serbia, while in Vojvodina it displayed a drop. 
In the sector of manufacturing, a year-to-year drop was registered in the 
manufacture of wood and cork products, the manufacture of radio, TV and 
communications equipment, the manufacture of leather and leather products, 
footwear and the manufacture of clothing and fur apparel. In the first seven 
months of this year, the manufacture of clothing and footwear considerably 
decreased compared to the same period the previous year, which is the main 
reason for the drop in exports of these products over the period under 
consideration. 
With regard to the structure of production by destination of consumption, the 
highest year-to-year growth in the first seven months of this year was achieved in 
the production of capital goods (8.1%), while intermediate goods registered only 
a mild growth (by 1.2%); as far as the production of consumer goods is 
concerned, it dropped by 2.1%. 
Retail trade turnover in the socially-owned sector in July rose by 4.0% month-on-
month in current prices, while in terms of constant prices, it remained unchanged. 
Wholesale turnover increased by 8% both in current and constant prices. 
 
CHART 
Retail Trade Turnover In The Socially-Owned Sector (in constant prices, January 
2001 = 100) 
- in YuD million 
 
Foreign Trade 
 
According to preliminary data, foreign trade in Serbia in July 2002 was valued at 
US$ 198 million, which is up by 37% in nominal terms year-to-year. Commodity 
imports were valued at US$ 437 million, which is up by 41% compared to July 
2001. Both exports and imports in the first seven months of this year recorded 
year-to-year growth by 16% and 18% respectively. 
Equipment imported from the beginning of this year is valued at US$ 578 million, 
and thus the share of these imports increased up to one-fifth, while the import of 
machinery specialized for particular industries and general industrial machinery 
registered considerable growth (nominal growth of over US$ 90 million or 60% in 
percentage terms). Furthermore, imports in almost all divisions of the sectors of 
machinery and transport equipment (according to the Standard International 
Trade Classification), increased compared to the previous year (besides the 
aforementioned ones, this referred to the following divisions: electrical 
machinery, apparatus and appliances, telecommunications apparatus and 
equipment and office machines and automatic data processing machines). This 
implies significant investments into production capacities in Serbia and activities 
on modernization of the existing and opening of the new production lines. This is 
by all means an encouraging trend and a basis for expectations of increases in 
industrial production in the near future. Investments in capital goods are certainly 
necessary, but they are not the only prerequisite for attaining this objective; 
production programs must be adjusted to the requirements of domestic and 
exporting markets, and management in enterprises needs to be improved. 
As far as the export of equipment is concerned, it is in stagnation with regard to 
the previous year; consequently, its share in total commodity exports is slightly 
reduced. The same applies for the sector of machinery and transport equipment, 
although all divisions but one in this group recorded increase in export value 
compared to the previous year. Such a trend resulted from the transport 
equipment division which recorded a 60% year-to-year decrease in exports 
value, i.e. a drop of US$ 22 million in absolute terms. In other divisions of this 
sector, the highest increase in absolute terms was achieved in the export of 
machinery specialized for particular industries, while in percentage terms, the 
most successful was the division of office machines and automatic data 
processing machines, and telecommunications apparatus and equipment; the 
export value in these divisions, which has been recorded during this year is 
several times higher than in the same period of the previous year (despite still 
being modest in absolute terms). 
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Monetary and Fiscal Policy 
 
 
Money supply at the end of August was YuD 7.9 billion, which is an 8.1% 
increase month-on-month. The process of remonetization continued; it was 
based on real parameters, which provided for maintenance of macroeconomic 
stability. Retail prices in August rose by as little as 0.4% compared to the 
previous month, which was the lowest level registered in the last five years. 
Real money supply at the end of July was EUR 1.59 billion, while at the end of 
August it was EUR 1.7 billion. 
Cash money supply rose by about YuD 2.3 billion (6.7%), reaching YuD 37.4 
billion at the end of August. Slower increase in cash money supply compared to 
the total money supply affected the reduction of its share in M1 from 36.2% to 
35.7%. 
Due to great increase in the value of foreign currency reserves in August 
(12.5%), the coverage of money supply with foreign currency reserves increased 
from 118.5% at the end of July to 123.9% at the end of August.  
According to the data provided by the Payment and Settlement Bureau, gross 
public revenues collection in July rose by 59.1% in nominal terms and by 34.2% 
in real terms year-to-year.   
In the period January – July, nominal increase in the collection of public revenues 
was 82%, while in real terms it rose by 48.2%. Higher growth rates in terms of 
cumulative figures compared to those registered in July resulted from very high 
efficiency in the collection of public revenues in July 2001, and not from 
deceleration in their real growth in this year. 
The revenues of social insurance organizations recorded higher growth rates, 
both in the period January – July 2002 relative to the same period of the previous 
year, and in July 2002 year-on-year. This increased the share of the revenues of 
these organizations in the period January – July from 35.4% to 37.2%. 
Due to different growth rates, the structure of collection of revenues for the 
budget and other users considerably changed. Sales tax revenues and income 
tax revenues increased their share, which is a positive indicator, implying 
legalization of business operations in Serbia. Other taxes also increased their 
share and, together with sales taxes and income taxes, were more than sufficient 
for compensating the drop in the collection of revenues from taxes and other 
budget revenues. 
Despite faster growth in the revenues of social insurance organizations than in 
budget revenues, owing to much faster increase in social expenditures, transfers 
from the budget to social funds are inevitable. 
All three kinds of social insurance were subsidized by the budget in the course of 
2002, whereby the health insurance fund received the lowest subsidies (about 
4% of the revenues achieved in this Fund). Old Age Pension Funds and the 
Unemployment Insurance Fund were subsidized at similar percentage levels 
(40% of the total revenues). 
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Structure of public revenues (%) I-VI 2001 I-VII 2001 I-VI 2002 I-VII 2002 VII 01 VII 02 
Revenues of the budget and other users 64.3 64.6 62.3 62.8 65.9 65.2
Sales tax 27.6 28.4 30.2 30.5 31.9 32.3
Income tax 11.7 12.2 14.6 14.5 14.3 14.0
Property tax 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.6 1.7
Other taxes 1.5 2.0 3.5 3.4 4.1 2.5
Fees 7.2 6.5 2.0 2.0 3.7 2.3
Customs 4.3 4.5 4.5 4.6 5.2 4.9
Other revenues for budget and other users  9.9 9.0 5.5 5.8 5.0 7.5
Spec. rev. of. Fed. Budg. And Rep. Budgets 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Soc. Insurance Org. Revenues 35.7 35.4 37.7 37.2 34.1 34.8
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Institutional Balance In the EU 
 
An important question in the forthcoming reform of the European Union is 
certainly the question of a precisely set institutional balance between the 
Union and its Member States. Namely, the current sharing of power as laid 
down in the Founding Treaties distinguishes three groups of power: 
exclusive power of the Union, exclusive power of Member States, and the 
areas in which the EU and Member States have common power. 
Furthermore, this system is marked by a complex network of objectives, 
fundamental power and functional power, primarily owing to four revisions 
of these treaties that have been carried out so far. Such a situation results 
from the fifty-year existence of the EU and from the fact that the institutions 
designed for the Community of Six with primarily economic objectives must 
be adjusted to a significant increase in membership today, and at the same 
time to growing political activity of the Union in a modern society. 
Alongside these practical conditions of adjustment of the EU to internal 
conditions, a very important role in urging the resolution of issue of 
institutional balance rests with the citizens of the EU and their increasingly 
active attitude observed in various Eurobarometer polls and public debates. 
Namely, these polls show a large gap between the expectations of European 
citizens and what the Union is actually doing.  
For these reasons there are plenty of proposals and calls for modernization 
and precise sharing of power between the Union and its Member States; a 
recent proposal came from the European Parliament, a Union’s institution 
composed of the representatives of the Union’s citizens, not the 
representatives of Member States. Namely, in July 2002 the Parliament, i.e. 
its Commission for Constitutional Issues, released a report on sharing of 
power between the EU and its Member States, which contains very precise 
proposals for new organization of institutional balance in the Union.  
In this report the European Parliament emphasizes that modernization and 
specification in the sharing of power must be based on the principles of 
subsidiarity and of proportion (two principles which were introduced by the 
Mastricht Treaty and specified in the Amsterdam Treaty, but are still not 
completed), with the main idea that better institutional balance would lead to 
clearer determination of political responsibility and in this way would 
strengthen democracy in Europe. In the Parliament’s view, this is only a 
repeated call for adopting the Constitution of the Union, which would 
reform different treaties and arrange them into a common text that would 
refer to a common political union with general capacity of legal entity.  
Institutional balance as was established in the Treaties is based on two 
principles: powers in the areas of various policies (customs, agriculture, 
transport, etc.) and powers based on objectives (above all, powers related to 
the completion of the internal market). To make the situation more complex, 
some of these objectives are not assigned directly to the Union, but to 
Member States (e.g. article 119 which refers to equal wages for male and 
female employees). In other cases previous activity of the Community is a 
prerequisite that enables Member States to undertake final measures. Such a 
situation is not only complicated, but leads towards wider inflexibility, while 
one way of overcoming this problem is to enable the widest possible 
application of general clauses, which extend the scope of the Community’s 
activities: this is the present article 308 of the EC Founding Treaty, which 
used to be the basis for more than 700 acts of community legislation. In the 
Parliament’s opinion, it is therefore necessary to clarify this situation by 
amending the Treaty to suit the experiences of modern constitutions, not of 
diplomatic instruments. 
On the other hand, the European Parliament points out that special attention 
must be paid to three groups of new participants – i.e. regions with 
legislative power, which exist today in the majority Member States; 
Candidate Countries whose expectations considerably differ from what is 
expected by present Member States; and public opinion, since public debate 
showed that “…the Europe which was created and which operates in 
Brussels, Strasbourg and Luxemburg is not the Europe which people desire.” 
To attain this objective, the European Parliament proposes a way of carrying 
out a precise sharing of power, primarily insisting on the fact that a policy 
model of the Union must keep its original directions in two areas: the 
administration of the Union’s policies must be subject to the Member States’ 
administration, while the main financial power (budget and taxes) must 
remain in the Member States. These two points are very important, and 
moreover, they are the main difference in comparison with the current 
federal systems in which the exercise of power is guaranteed by the 
Constitution and is followed by the appropriate financial prerogatives.   
In the majority of cases today the Union must be satisfied with legislative 
power and with the setting the rules, while on the other hand, it is in charge 
of coordinating the measures which are undertaken by Member States. 
Member States, however, keep the monopoly on the actual pursuing of 
public policies and relations with citizens. Thus, the very question of 
legislative power is one that is not precisely defined, although three 
Communities were founded fifty years ago. The Parliament proposes three 
ways for resolving this problem. Firstly, to accept that there are two separate 
institutions with equal legislative power – the Parliament (the representative 
of citizens) and the Council (the representative of states). Secondly, the 
return to the original philosophy which is the basis for community legal 
systems according to which political authorities create legal principles (law), 
while practical issues are assigned to executive authorities – that is why the 
Parliament proposes a distinction between legislative acts (which are 
adopted by the Parliament and the Council on the basis of co-decision-
making procedures) and administrative acts (adopted by the Commission). 
The third way of resolving the problem of division of legislative power 
refers to the establishment of a general rule that the enforcement of adopted 
principles (i.e. executive authority) is an issue assigned to Member States or 
their regional or local institutions, but can be delegated to the Commission 
or to specialized agencies. 
The European Parliament was clear and in its report offered suggestions for 
more precise sharing of power between the Union and Member States. The 
areas assigned exclusively to the EU, in which Member States cannot 
exercise any influence except when they are explicitly invited to do so by the 
Union, and which have already been organized thus today, are monetary 
policy, customs policy, external economic relations (which is partially 
limited in the area of commodity trade by the Nice Treaty), competition 
policy, the policies of structure and cohesion, and the policy of the Euro. 
More significant, however, is that the Parliament suggested some policies 
which should be treated also as exclusive powers of the Union. This refers to 
the financing of the Union’s budget, legal foundations in the area of freedom 
and security (as a logical consequence of an internal market), and, as 
especially interesting, to foreign affairs. In fact, the Parliament asked the 
question both of itself and of the Union as a whole, whether “… foreign 
policy, like monetary and trade policies, should become exclusively assigned 
to the Union in the future?”; this idea has very strong public support. On the 
other hand, the Parliament has not come out with similar suggestions with 
regard to agriculture and fisheries, although they have an important place in 
the development of the process of European integration, and still have a 
significant share in the Community’s budget. 
As far as common powers of the Union and its Member States are 
concerned, the Parliament establishes two types of such powers. The first 
category of powers creates policies which supplement the single market 
(protection of consumers, agriculture, fishery, transport, trans-European 
networks, environment protection, research and technological development, 
energy, social policy and employment, immigration policy, gender equality, 
developmental cooperation and taxes linked to the single market). The 
second category of common powers refers to the implementation of foreign 
policy and internal and external defense and security policies. To make these 
common powers more precise, the European Parliament proposes several 
main principles on which they should be based. Namely, the Community’s 
legislation should set out guidelines, principles and objectives of these 
policies, while transplantation and practical implementation in internal legal 
systems is on the side of Member States – the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportion assume full significance in this. National governments can adopt 
laws in the absence of European regulations, but if a common regulation 
exists, it takes priority over national legal systems. With regard to special 
common powers in which the Union has a subsidiary role only, while the 
main initiative is on the side of Member States’ governments (education, 
training, the youth, sport, tourism), the scope of the Community’s measures 
must be established in each individual case without going into details.  
The basic proposal offered by the European Parliament for the sake of 
clearer division of power in relation to the power assigned to Member States 
is very simple – it must be laid down clearly that, with regard to issues not 
specified by the Founding Treaties, they remain the sovereign power of a 
Member State as its sovereign right. However, besides this basic principle, it 
is suggested that some issues that by their nature belong to national 
jurisdictions must be precisely established, e.g. fiscal policy and territorial 
organization of the state. 
Considered thus, the European Parliament’s proposal of precise sharing of 
power in the Union leads clearly towards the idea that modernization in 
sharing of power inevitably concerns essential issues not only related to the 
role of the Union, but also its nature and especially its relation to Member 
States. Closely related is the question of whether the Union is ready to shift 
from the sharing of power, which is, as was expressed in the Parliament,  
”…created by diplomats for their own needs”, to constitutional sharing of 
power. If the answer is negative, there is no need for further elaboration of 
similar proposals. However, if the answer is positive, this will open a new 
chapter in the history of the Community that will require a completely 
different legal and political architecture – which is the price that must be 
paid for the political union of an enlarged Europe. 
 
Economic Newsi 
 
As the accession of candidate countries to the European Union is 
approaching, the issues opened with the initiation of this process require 
rapid resolution. One such issue refers to the relation of candidate countries 
towards third countries. 
Countries hoping to join the European Union risk being caught in the 
diplomatic crossfire that threatens to develop into a new transatlantic trade 
row between the USA and the EU. 
The disputes with the EU over steel and agricultural subsidies (which are 
still underway), made the USA sensitive to all signals coming form the EU, 
treating them as a kind of threat or punishment. The USA has stepped up its 
battle in preventing the EU from forcing candidate countries to ditch or 
substantially alter current bilateral agreements with the USA. 
US trade officials say that the so-called “bilateral investment treaties” 
(BITs), concluded with candidate countries, are vital for American business 
investments in CEE countries and that moves aimed at annulling them will 
be counter productive.  
On the other hand, applicant countries have received clear signals from 
Brussels that such accords are incompatible with membership in the Union 
and current EU – USA trade agreements. Also, the Commission has 
confirmed that it will argue at talks in September that the bilateral treaties 
must be watered down soon.  
Third party, i.e. candidate countries, which have found themselves caught in 
the middle, realize that the problem is not only legal, but political, as well, 
and fear the impact which the whole debate and its outcome will have on 
trade relations with the USA as one of the biggest trade partners of these 
countries. Therefore, they will try to take a mediating role in convincing the 
Commission to let them keep a part, if not all, of their US accords in force. 
On the other hand, if they are forced to make concessions because of 
obligations undertaken towards the EU, these countries will try to get 
confirmation from the US that “they are not offended and that they accept 
the situation”. 
American businessmen and investors, as those who would be affected most 
by eventual abrogation of these accords, also took action. They contacted 
their trade representatives in the country and in Brussels, urging them to act 
on the looming threat to trade. For American businessmen, the existing deals 
protect their corporate interests and prevent errant governments from 
expropriating their assets. These agreements send an important message to 
investors, and their abrogation would affect insecure protection of US 
investors’ rights, which would further affect their future investment 
decisions.  
Brussels officials, however, insist that full EU membership would be in the 
interest of companies investing in candidate countries. Moreover, there is no 
evidence that the lack of BITs will stop US companies investing in the 
fifteen current member states. Substantial changes to the bilateral treaties are 
necessary because of clear conflicts with EU legislation, i.e. acquis 
communitaire. If BITs were allowed to stay in force, this would enable 
American investors to circumvent present strict legislation in many areas 
and gain access to the EU single market through the back door. 
Slovenia, a small and relatively well developed country, quite efficiently 
organized and with stable political support for the enlargement process, and 
one of the most successful candidate countries for EU membership, faces its 
own problems related to this process. 
According to Janez Potocnik, Slovenian Minister for Relations with the EU, 
these problems are currently related to winning public support for the 
process of accession to the EU, because there are always certain questions 
and problems which have not been completely defined; it is sometimes 
difficult for the public to fully support this process. Most often the problem 
is that some politicians are adept at presenting their own political and 
economic interests as national economic interests. As a consequence, the 
public sometimes feels that in the process of negotiations, the government 
all-too-often succumbs to the pressures of the Union and unconditionally 
accepts its demands. In addition, this is accompanied by the question as to 
why Slovenia, which not long ago voluntarily left a common federal state, 
would want to join a new group of countries which, although different from 
the former, still amounts to a close union. 
The answer to both questions, in Minister Potocnik’s opinion, is the desire of 
the Slovenian Government for progress and prosperity for the Slovenian 
population.  
As Minister Potocnik explained, seven years ago Slovenia adopted the 
Strategy of Economic Development, a strategic document resulting from a 
consensus in expert and political circles which defined key global measures 
needed to help Slovenia build a democratic, market oriented economy and a 
private-property-based country. The main goals set fourth by this document 
were: faster economic growth aimed at catching up with the developed EU 
countries; economic competitiveness; European integration and sustainable 
economic development, taking into full account environmental, social and 
cultural development. 
Since it was one of the strategically defined national goals, a decision was 
made on starting negotiations and launching preparations for membership in 
the EU. Thus the strategic document was transformed into operational goals 
in the national program for the adoption of the acquis. 
As Minister Potocnik emphasized, accession to the EU thus significantly 
speeded up the fulfillment of their own goals. He immediately raised the 
question of what Slovenia can expect from future membership, i.e. to what 
extent EU membership is in the interest of Slovenia. 
The enforcement of common European rules and regulations will contribute 
to increased transparency, stability and predictability of the operating 
environment in Slovenian economic subjects. Slovenia will become a part of 
the area which is well on the way to being an area of stability and prosperity. 
Slovenia is convinced that with its knowledge, active role and constructive 
and efficient participation it can contribute to and enrich the future 
development of the Union. Both member states and candidate countries are 
aware of the high political accountability of the process and have been 
intensely engaged in realizing the tasks set forth. Slovenia is taking the final 
and crucial steps on the path toward membership. Although most of the 
discussions at this stage of negotiations are about the costs of the accession 
process, not only in Slovenia but in other candidate countries as well, for 
everything advanced so far Slovenia is well aware of the benefits of 
membership, and it is therefore irrelevant whether or not it will be richer by 
1 or 2% in the final analysis. But on the other hand, because of that 
awareness, Slovenia must not and cannot accept solutions which would not 
guarantee fair, equal and just membership for all candidates. This is so, 
Minister Potocnik concluded, because of the values which constitute the 
essence of the European Union which Slovenia is entering and because of 
the Union that Slovenia wants to build together in the future.  
Regional unemployment rates in the EU and the CEE candidate countries 
varied widely in 2001. The unemployment rate (measured by the share of 
unemployed in the total economically active population) in the EU ranged 
from 1.2% in the region of Utrecht in the Netherlands to 33.3% in that of 
Reunion in France. The disparities were of the same order of magnitude in 
candidate countries: from 2.0% in the region of Kozep-Magyarorszag in 
Hungary, to 32.8% in that of Severozapaden in Bulgaria. Regional 
unemployment rates fell between April 2000 and April 2001 in more than 
80% of the 209 regions in the EU, as well as in half of the 53 regions in 
candidate countries. 
The data on regional unemployment was complied on the basis of the 
Community Labor Force Survey, and is comparable between the regions of 
the EU and the candidate countries.  
Of the 209 regions in the EU accounted for in April 2001, 53 (nearly one 
third of which were in the United Kingdom) had an unemployment rate of 
3.8% or less, i.e. half the average for the EU. Only Greece, Spain and France 
had no region with a rate equal to or less than half the EU average, including 
Denmark, which comprises a single unit. At the other extreme, 16 regions 
had a rate of 15.2% or higher, i.e. double that of the EU: five of them were 
in Italy, four in France, three in Germany and Spain and one in Greece. 
Of 53 regions in CEE countries, only one region in the Czech Republic and 
two regions in Hungary had rates lower than half the EU average. In 16 
regions, the unemployment rate was equal to or lower than that of the EU 
(7.6% in 2001), out of which six regions were in Romania, two in Hungary, 
four in the Czech Republic and one in Slovenia. In 22 regions, the 
unemployment rate was more than double that of the EU, out of which 
thirteen were in Poland, five in Bulgaria, three in the Slovak Republic and 
one in Lithuania. 
A comparison of unemployment rates in the regions shows similar levels of 
unemployment for both men and women in the candidate countries, whereas 
in the EU, unemployment among women is frequently higher than that of 
men. Female unemployment was higher than male unemployment in 2001 in 
more then 75% of the regions of the EU and in 55% of the regions of the 
candidate countries. 
Regional differences in the unemployment rate for young people under age 
25 are more marked than those for the economically active population as a 
whole. In the EU in 2001 unemployment rates for young people ranged from 
2.1% in the region of Utrecht in the Netherlands, to as much as 59.9% in the 
region of Campania in Italy. In the candidate countries, the rates varied from 
3.0% in the region Kozep-Magyarorszag in Hungary, to an alarming 75.5% 
in the region Severozapaden in Bulgaria. 
                                                 
i Source: “Midday Express”, http://europa.eu.int/comm/press_room/index_en.htm; and “European Voice”, 
Volume 8 Number 30, August 1, 2002, The Economist Group, Brussels, Belgium 
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FRY: Basic Economic Indicators
θ 2001 VII 2002 VII 2002 I-VII 2002
θ 2000 VI 2002 VII 2001 I-VII 2001
GDP growth rate* 5.5% … … … ...
Industrial Production 0.0% … -2.0% 7.3% -0.2%
     Montenegro -0.7% … 10.5% 24.5% -6.4%
     Serbia 0.1% … -2.8% 6.2% 0.2%
          Central Serbia -4.0% … -1.2% 5.6% 0.1%
          Vojvodina 9.2% … -6.2% 7.5% 0.3%
Average nominal net  wage - Serbia in YuD. 125%** 9,342 3.9% 49.0% 10.48%***
Nominal gross  wage - Serbia, in YuD1 … 13,461 3.9% 49.5% 10.85%***
Real growth in average net wage  - Serbia in %2 16.6%** … -0.4% 28.9% 2.87%***
Ratio of consumer basket to average net wage … 1.2 -8.0% -32.0% …
Unemployment rate  - Serbia registered3 4.4% 28.0% 0.2% 3.4% 4.6%
Current account, in USD million -87.1% … … … …
Trade balance,  in USD million -58.5% -274 -2.2% -41.2% -2.9%
Export, in  USD million 10.5% 206 32.1% 30.3% 12.9%
     Montenegro 10.3% 7 133.3% -48.7% -10.6%
     Serbia 10.4% 198 29.4% 36.7% 15.5%
Import, in USD million 30.3% 480 13.2% 36.4% 12.3%
     Montenegro 49.3% 42 40.0% 16.8% -24.5%
     Serbia 27.9% 437 18.7% 40.8% 18.4%
Money supply  (M1), in YuD bn (end of period)4 109.8% 104.68 8.1% … …
     Cash 103.4% 37.37 6.7% … …
     Deposit 113.7% 67.31 8.9% … …
Real money supply,  DEM mil. (end of period) 94.1% … … … …
NBY hard curr. reserves, USD mil. (end of period) 4 123.0% 2098 13.3% 132.7% 135.8%
Discount rate  - monthly level A58 -26.65% 0.75% 0.0% -68.0% …
Market interest rate  - monthly level -18.40% 1.68% 1.8% -50.1% …
Retail prices  - Serbia 4 91.8% … 0.4% 16.4% 21.9%
Consumer prices  - Serbia 4 93.3% … 0.1% 13.0% 19.3%
Producer prices - Serbia 87.8% … 5.9% 9.1% …
Average exchange rate (YuD/EUR) - average 16.5% 60.78 0.3% 2.2% 2.0%
*Preliminary figures.
** According to the previous methodology. 
***The figures refer to growth in wages in July 2002 relative to December 2001.  
1By the gross wage methodology applied as of June 1, 2001.
2Deflator is cost-of-living index.
3 The figures include the employed in socially-owned sector, private sector and SMEs. 
4 The figures refer to August     
VII 2002
